Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1976

Young Electric Sign Co. v. Basil Vetas : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Olmstead, Stine and Campbell; Richard W. Campbell; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant;
J. Thomas Bowen; Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Young Electric Sign Co. v. Vetas, No. 14653 (Utah Supreme Court, 1976).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/428

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Ill

. a ..
.
•

YO'ONG ELEC?:Rfet~/· ·.
COMPAJIY, , ·'
, I•. :t .

. c

J:. TJIQ}~Af BOQltl . \ r . ·
~s· i¢li\l state St:!'ee<t~,
~-~~ ~ City, Utah
.
' · ?\~rney fa~ Pla:~.m~::....,ex
p.~if,:Respondent.
_,. J f

·..
.
'

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * * * * * *
YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN
COMPANY,
Plaintiff/
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-vs-

Case No. 1465 3

BASIL VETAS, dba
SIR BASIL'S,
Defendant/
Appellant.

* * * * * * * * * * *
BRIEF

OF

APPELLANT

* * *
Appeal from a Judgement of the
Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County,
the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Judge.

* * *
OLMSTEAD, STINE and CAMPBELL
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL
2650 Washington Boulevard, #101
Ogden, Utah
84401
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant.
J. THOMAS BOWEN
345 South State Street, #101
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
The complaint in this case was filed by Young Electric
Sign Company (here called 'Young') alleging Basil Vetas (here
called 'Vetas') to be in default under a sign rental agreement
and asking a money judgment.

Vetas denied the allegations.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Trial was held May 11, 1976, before the Honorable
Ernest F. Baldwin, sitting without a jury.

The District Court

found Vetas in default, and entered judgment against him for
$1,612.54.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Vetas asks this Court to reverse the lower court
judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1961, Vetas signed with Young a "Rental Agreement"
calling for installation of an electric sign at Vetas' drive-in
establishment, 999 Washington Boulevard, Ogden.
is a printed form used by Young.

(Ex 8-D) •

This agreement

Vetas paid $660

deposit, and agreed to pay $110 per month during the 96 month lease
time.

Young to maintain the sign (par. g); Vetas to pay all sales

tax and electricity charges (par. e).
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The sign was auly built and installed by Young in 1961,
at a cost to it of $4,680.14 (R-119).

Both parties performed

fully under the agreement through January of 1963, when a new
contract was executed, replacing the original (Ex 9-D).

This

contract left intact the original sign, but called for Young to
install some lighted plexiglass panels on Vetas' building at the
same location.

The new "rental agreement"

(Ex 9-D) called for

96 monthly payments by Vetas of $135.00, with the other terms
of the agreement identical to the 1961 contract.

No work was

performed on the original sign; the 1963 work installed by Young
on the building was at a cost to it of $2,696.35 (R-120).
Both parties again performed under the contract until
the late fall of 1967.

A new contract was then executed.

Vetas

needed the payments to be less than $100 per month, and after
negotiation the new contract called for payment of $99.17 per mont
for a new term of 96 months.

(Ex 3-D).

At the time the contract

was executed Vetas was in arrears 4 payments, or $558.92

(Ex

1-D).

No new work or construction of any nature was done at this time
by Young (R-79) ; the new contract related solely to the then
existing pole sign (installed in 1961) and panel lighting (instalU
in 1963).
The only dispute between the parties as to the execution
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of the 1967 agreement relates to the $660 deposit.
it was still a deposit as of December 1967.

All agree

Gilbert, manager

of Young, testified the deposit was, in December of 1967, simply
credited to Vetas' account (R-136).

This was done he stated

to compensate for an error of $1,200 he made in calculating
the new contract price (R-85} •

Vetas denied he had ever been

informed by Young the deposit was being used or charged off
(R-150}.

Exhibit 3-D, the original white contract signed

December 5, 1967 by both parties, and kept in the custody of
Young, reflects the $660.00 deposit still being held by Young
(par. 4)
The Trial Court resolved this controversy

agal~st

Yo~ng

(R-58) and allowed it as a credit to Vetas on sums found owing
Young in 1973 and 1974.
Vetas duly paid his installments under the new agreement
until the winter of 1973-74.

As of December l, 1973, Young

claimed Vetas owed 6 payments, including December (Ex 6-P, R-112)
A demand letter (Ex 4-D) was sent by Young to Vetas threatening to,
among other things, disconnect his electricity and repossess the
sign.

Vetas paid another payment of $103.63 on December 26 (Ex 5-D,

R-113)

reducing the payments owed to 5 (R-127) or $587.54.
Suit was filed by Young (R-2) alleging default in payments

of $585.54 as of December 1, 1973, and asking liquidated damages
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plus arrearage and atturney fees.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING VETAS IN DEFAULT
UNDER THE CONTRACT.
It is not disputed that Vetas was in arrears through
December of 1973, 5 payments at $99.17 per month, plus sales tax
and interest, or $584.54.

This is what Young alleged, and Vetas

does not dispute the accuracy of the delinquent payments.

Yet,

Vetas was not in default because of three key facts:
l)

As of December, 1973, Vetas no longer had a $660.00

deposit showing on Young's books.

Gilbert, Young's manager,

testified this had been taken off and applied in 1967 to compensate for an error made in computing the 1967 contract (R-85, 136).
Krantz, the bookkeeper for Young, said the $660.00 had been
credited to Young as a set off against the miscalculation of the
new contract (R-122).

The money was never credited to Vetas'

account (R-122) and was not used to pay past due installments in
1967 or 1973 (R-124).

No records were available to show what had

actually happened to the $660.00, Young was not able to locate
them for trial (R-121).
2)

Ex 1-D, the calculation sheet used by Young in fig-

uring the 1967 contract, shows the past due installments in November of 1967 ($558.92) being included in the new contract, in £a:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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being more than included by reason of a monthly charge of $8.61
for 96 months, representing the $558.92 plus 8 years' interest
of $268.29.

This confirms Vetas' deposit was never used to apply

on back due installments.
3)

The Trial Court found (R-58) there was insufficient

evidence for it to determine the disposition of the deposit, and
therefore found Vetas was entitled to a credit of $660.00.
It is well to note, in addition to the above, that no
written documentation of the alleged use of the deposit was ever
offered.

Vetas denied ever being informed prior to suit the

deposit had been set off or used (R-150) •
What we are saying here is that Young had in fact appropriated Vetas $660.00, but improperly so!

Therefore, since

~e

was entitled to that credit in 1976, he surely was also entitled
to it in 1973 when Young declared him in default and filed suit.
The question is not the same as whether the tenant is entitled to
have a security deposit off set on his demand against unpaid
rentals.

He may, or may not, and we do not ask this court to

address itself to that issue.
In our case, the deposit had in fact been appropriated
by Young.

It originally appeared in his account as a credit (R-122)

but did not as of December 1973.

The complaint (R-2) denies the
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existence of such deposit.

Vetas was entitled to that credit

of $660.00 in December of 1973; his obligation was less than
$600, he was not then in default.

Nevertheless, Young declared

him in default, refused to maintain the sign after January l, 1974,
and filed this suit.

Young was the party in default,

for its

admitted failure to maintain the sign after January l, 1974 (R-109).
Since Young failed to perform when Vetas was not in default, it
is not entitled to recover.

See 17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts,

Newsom v. Liberty Sign Co. Tex. 1967, 416

s.w.

~425,

2d 442.

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE LIQUIDATED
DAMAGE PROVISION OF THE CONTRACT REASONABLE.
The Trial Court found (R-58) the lease provision (par. B)
with reference to liquidated damages reasonable.

Upon such find-

ing, it gave Young judgment for 75% of the rentals from February,
1974, through May, 1975.

It did so even though it was undisputed

Young performed absolutely no maintenance during the period, and
repossessed the sign in February, 1975.
The original cost of the sign and 1963 building panels
was $7,376.00,

(R-119, 120).

During the period 1961 through 1973

Vetas paid over $17,000.00 in rentals to Young (Ex 5-D)

No

improvements were made by Young during this period.
In addition to recouping the cost of the installation
over the term of the contract, Young had other items of expense,
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namely, maintenance, insurance and taxes.

In this case, using a

percentage of original cost as a basis, Gilbert, Young's manager,
testified that included in the monthly payment of $99.17 were
the following:

(R-90)
Maintenance
Taxes
Insurance

$50.00
15.00
15.00

Maintenance cost records could not be found by Young.
However, testimony was given by the credit manager (R-114) that
1973 maintenance costs were $175.00.
With regard to taxes, again no records could be found
but Gilbert testified Young paid taxes on the signs of $3.75 per
month (R-135).
The third element, insurance, is in a state of doubt.
Gilbert testified Young was self insured (R-90)

Krantz testified

Young was self insured on property damage (R-116) and had blanket
coverage on liability.

No evidence was offered as to the expense

of this coverage to Young.
In December, 1973, Young declared the contract in default
and terminated maintenance and service (Ex 4-D, R-91, 109).
the sign had no value to Young (Ex 3-D, par. 8; R-78)

Since

insurance

would immeidately be reduced to the extent it was self insured.
The cost of the liability insurance, which is unknown but could
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not be great, would continue until it was junked.

The taxes,

assessed in January, would continue through the year 1974.

Main-

tenance, of course, ceased to be any factor.
By December of 1973, Vetas had already paid 12 years
on the original sign, and 10 years on the 1963 additions.

All

payments were made under 8 year or 96 month leases, and certainly
by then Young had long since recouped the original cost of the
installations.

Nevertheless, Vetas has to pay $1,188.00 to Young,

representing the liquidated damages of 75% of the months from
February of 1974 to May, 1975 at $99.17 per month.
Restatement of the Law, Contracts, Section 339 provides:
"§ 339. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AND PENALTIES.
(1) An agreement, made in advance of
breach, fixing the damages therefor, is not
enforceable as a contract and does not affect
the damages recoverable for the breach, unless
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable
forecast of just compensation for the
harm that is caused by the breach, and
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach
is one that is incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation.

This principle is generally recognized as controlling in
these neon sign and other rental cases, see Ray v. Electrical
Products, Wyo. 1964, 390 P2 607; Electrical Products Consolidated
v. Sweet, lOth C.C.A. 1936, 83 F2 6.

The lessor is entitled to

recover only its actual damage for breach of contract in such
cases,

~.

supra.
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We submit both requirements of §339 are violated here.
First, the 75% figure does not reasonably relate to the real
damage, and second, Young has years of experience, and could
accurately figure those damages in advance.
We note of the $99.00 payment, $50.00 per month was
allocated to maintenance, $15.00 to taxes and $15.00 to insurance,
a total of $80.00.

As previously set out, the tax figure was

actually $3.75 per month.

The self insurance or damage would

terminate since Young's position is the sign was valueless.
The maintenance figure terminated also, as of January 1, 1974.
Therefore, under the evidence Young's costs during the
16 months it was awarded 75% of rentals were only $3.75 per month.
Even assuming it was entitled to the other $19.17

($99.l7 - $80.00)

per month as finishing payment on the original sign (which we dispute) nevertheless Young was awarded about $75.00 per month for
16 months when its actual cost was $3.75, or at most $22.94
($19.17 + $3.71).

It is fine to say Young is entitled to the

benefit of its bargain; and some cases (see Young Electric Sign Co.
v. Capps, Idaho 1971, 492 P2 57) have held 75% of unpaid rentals
is reasonable.

Each case must stand on its own proof, and Young

Electric calculated, in negotiating the contract, maintenance at
$50.00, taxes at $15.00 and insurance at $15.00.
Using these figures, the ones the parties contracted
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with reference to, Yow1g after January 1, 1974 eliminates insurance,
maintenance, and $11.25 of taxes.

We submit there was no 'reason-

able forecast of actual damage' and Young is not entitled to the
penalty imposed on Vetas for liquidated damages.
CONCLUSION
We submit Young, not Vetas, was in default under this
contract when suit was filed.

We further submit the damages

awarded of $1,188.00 were a penalty and should be stricken from
the judgment.
Respectfully,

RICHARD W. CAMPBELL
Attorney for Appellant, Basil Vetas
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